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Abstract 
 
With the rise of social media and fast-paced news, the American electorate is 
inundated with information now more than ever. One of the consequences of the 
increase in technology is the proliferation of fake news. Fake news is defined as 
“fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in 
organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al. 2018). The growth of the Internet 
means that more information is conveniently accessible to people without any 
sort of vetting for factual basis. 
 
Although scholars have done much to chart the landscape of fake news, less is 
known about how much people believe it and why. This dissertation seeks to 
understand the role of news source cues and the individual characteristics and 
traits that shape the believability of news.  
 
The credibility of a source affects whether people believe what they see, read, or 
hear. When the source is high in credibility, people are likely to accept the 
information as true but if the source is low in credibility, people are likely to be 
skeptical or reject the information. For the news, previous research suggests that 
source credibility matters in precisely this way (Druckman 2001). Yet, the 
credibility of a news source can be ambiguous, and people often have biases 
that predispose them to believing a story. Such is the world of fake news wherein 
"news organizations" masquerading as reputable sources peddle sensationalistic 
stories.  
 
Using a nationally representative sample, I conducted a survey experiment 
featuring ten news stories and a variety of news sources, mainstream and fake. I 
find little evidence that people are mindful of the news source. Regardless of 
whether a story comes from a well-established source such as ABC News or an 
unknown fake news source, people largely disregard news source cues. Instead, 
in line with the theories of partisan motivated reasoning, respondents react to the 
partisan tenor of news, believing news that confirms their partisan biases and 
disbelieving news to the contrary. Aside from partisanship, I also find various 
traits, some political and some nonpolitical such as the Big 5 personality traits, to 
help account for who is susceptible to fake news. I find that those who are low in 
political knowledge, high in self-monitoring, and high in magical thinking are more 
likely to be susceptible to believing in fake news.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
With the rise of social media and fast-paced news, the American electorate 
was inundated with information in the 2016 election. Rather than receiving their 
information solely from the television or from the newspapers, people instead 
receive election information on multiple applications across multiple devices. 
Social media now propagates the quick and efficient spreading of information. 
Although having an abundance of easily available news information has the 
potential to create a better-informed public, it also has the potential to misinform. 
One consequence of the changed media environment that I examine is the 
proliferation of fake news.  
 
Change in Media 
 
 Twenty years ago, the majority of Americans received their news from 
either the television, newspaper, or radio. Today, there is not only an increase in 
the amount of news stations and publications, there is also an increase in news 
mediums. The list of devices has expanded from just television and radio to 
including tablets, laptops, smartphones, and more. According to the ANES, only 
24% of households had access to the Internet in 1996. By 2008, 70% of 
households had access to the Internet (a 46% increase).1  
How does the increase in Internet availability change the way people 
receive political information? With regards to political media, ANES data shows 
that there is a significant increase from the 6% that saw election campaign 
information on the Internet in 1996 to 2004 where 41% of people said they did. 
When it comes to getting the news on older forms of media, those that used to 
watch national TV news everyday declined from 26% in 1984 to 15% in 2008 
(ANES). This is also largely generational where the older age groups who grew 
up on television and radio are more likely to be the ones to still watch TV news, 
while the younger generation is adopting new forms of news like social media.  
 The increase in the types of devices also changes the speed at which 
information can reach a person. Just within a four-year time span (between 2012 
to 2016), the percentage of people that owned smartphones grew by 34% 
(ANES).2  As our devices become smarter, faster and more compact, we’re 
essentially capable of accessing all of the nation’s, if not the world’s, news 
organizations in our pockets. People are now notified by their favorite news 
entities and can receive a neatly packaged collection of news channels with their 
morning coffee on their tablet instead of relying on one newspaper.  
Despite this enormous shift in how people receive the news, the public’s 
interest in, and consumption of, political news has not changed over time. The 
                                               
1 The percentage of households that have Internet has probably increased by 2018, but 
the last time the question is asked in the ANES is in 2008. 
2 In 2012, 34% of people said they had a smartphone in comparison to 2016 where 78% 
of people said they had a smartphone. 
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ANES shows that people in 2016 are just as interested, if not more interested in 
politics as they were in 2000.3 The difference is in how people receive this 
information. 
This year, two-thirds of Americans (66%) will receive news from social 
media (Pew Research 2018).  In 2016, Pew Research reported that out of the 
67% that use Facebook, 44% received news from it. Individuals can use these 
social media platforms to get information not only from their favorite news 
sources but also from their friends and family. People can have these 
applications downloaded to their phone and implement a setting that gives them 
notifications when news, that’s tailored to their interest, is available.  
In the 2016 ANES, 40% of respondents reported that they used social 
media every single day to learn about the Presidential election. While many 
social media users will stumble upon news, this figure suggests that many use 
social media to actively search for political information when needed. In fact, the 
2017 Pew Research reports 25% of adults had received news from two or more 
different social media sites.  
Social media according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is “forms of 
electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and 
microblogging) through which users create online communities to share 
information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos).”4 
Information is no longer a one-way road where the daily news trickles down from 
well-established news organizations to the public. Social media has made 
information a collaborative environment that allows for the back and forth 
between people, media, and government. The distance between each persons 
has never been smaller. 
The proliferation of news sources has made it easy for many types of 
news organizations to flourish including websites, blogs, YouTube channels, 
Facebook pages, and much more. As technology has advanced, these changes 
have dramatically altered the news environment. While easier and quicker 
access to information should be a good thing for democracy, it is not without its 
challenges and sacrifices. This dissertation is about one of the major challenges 
that has been introduced with the new information age: fake news.  
 
Social Media and Fake News 
 
Social media has undoubtedly changed the way the public receives and 
engages with their news.  In 2016, the Internet was the number one way people 
got information about the 2016 campaign, in comparison to television, radio, and 
                                               
3 The ANES has a question about people’s interest in political campaigns ranging on a 
3pt scale from “not much interested” to “very much interested.” The interest has been 
steadily increasing where in 2000 those who responded as “very much interested” was 
29%. In 2008, it was 23% and in 2016, it was 52%. 
4 Throughout the rest of this dissertation, social media will refer to any place where 
information is shared between people via Internet. 
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newspaper (ANES).5 But it’s not merely the Internet that changed the way people 
receive information, it’s the new platforms within the Internet.  
 The expansion of information that has come from social media has not 
been without consequences. The most painful and pressing consequence, 
particularly in the world of politics, is the rise of fake news. For this dissertation, I 
use the definition outlined created by 16 scholars who authored the 
interdisciplinary piece titled, “The science of fake news.” The authors define fake 
news as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not 
in organizational process or intent” (Lazer et al. 2018).6  Not all fake news articles 
are completely fabricated, some may have some truth or be grounded in some 
event that actually occurred. If it wasn’t apparent to everyone prior to the 2016 
presidential election that the Internet is full of falsities, it is now. The rise of the 
Internet and blogs means that more information is conveniently accessible to 
people without any sort of vetting for factual basis. 
There are some types of fake news that the majority of people agree is 
fake due to its content. For example, a story about Hillary Clinton plotting an alien 
invasion to win the US election is one of them. The credibility of other fake news 
stories is harder to discern. This is why a number of fact checking sources like 
Politifact or Snopes exist. The sole purpose of these organizations is to fact 
check the factual accuracy of news stories. Some articles may be grounded in 
truth but contain a lot of falsities. Others may contain a lot of fabricated content 
but is packaged in a way that makes them seem more credible. All of these 
variations of fake news make it difficult to identify which are fake and which are 
real.  
The accuracy of news falls along a continuum. There have been attempts 
to categorize the different gradations of falsities/truth in news. For example, the 
Deception Detection for News at the University of Western Ontario categorized 
five types of fake news ranging from “intentionally deceptive” to “slanted reporting 
of real facts.” First Draft News identifies seven types of fake news giving it a 
broader definition that ranges from “satire” to “manipulated content” to “fabricated 
content.” For the purposes of this research, fake news will be defined as news 
stories that have no factual basis but are presented as credible news. While the 
intention and purpose behind the fake news is important, it’s difficult to 
differentiate and pinpoint the origins of fake news websites.  
 More recently, “fake news” has also become a term used to impugn 
credible news sources. As a result, the meaning of fake news has become 
murkier as President Trump, the most prominent user of this political tactic, calls 
mainstream news sources such as CNN “fake news” when they report stories 
that are critical of his administration. In Trump’s first press conference, for 
                                               
5 In the 2016 ANES, 38% of respondents said they went to the Internet “a good many of 
times” to get info about the 2016 presidential campaign. This is in comparison with the 
TV (24%), radio (18%), and newspaper (18%).  
6 The authors concede that this definition largely focuses on the processes of the 
publisher and the intent rather than the individual news stories. 
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example, he pointed at CNN’s Senior White House Correspondent, Jim Costa, as 
being a part of a fake news organization. Now there is precedent to call sites that 
express views opposite of your beliefs or ideologies as fake news. While this take 
on “fake news” is substantively very interesting and should be further studied, 
this use of the term will remain outside the scope of this dissertation. 
The concept of fake news, as defined here, is nothing new. Prior to the 
Internet, there were false news and conspiracy theories sent in pamphlets and 
through the mail. The National Enquirer, a newsstand tabloid that began in 1926, 
is well known for its exaggerated and sometimes blatantly false articles. In the 
early days of the Internet, e-mail chain mails were laden with fake information. 
Today, there are myriad fake news websites disguised as real news with 
seemingly credible domain names. While someone may know the National 
Enquirer to be a publication that is not credible, there usually is not an easy way 
to know the credibility of the thousands of online publications out there, some 
churning out blatantly false headlines daily.  
 
Trust in Media and Fake News 
 
 One of the consequences of fake news seems to be the diminishing 
credibility of the media and increasing distrust with it. As it becomes harder and 
harder to discern reliable information, the backlash may be to become skeptical 
of any and all information. The majority of Americans say fake news has left them 
confused about basic facts (Pew Research Center 2016), and consumers of 
news claim that they expect much of the information to be largely inaccurate 
(Pew Research Center 2018).  Furthermore, inaccuracy is still the highest 
concern for people with social media (Pew Research Center 2018). The concern 
of something being too biased or political comes second to inaccuracy (Pew 
Research Center 2018). 
 A 2016 report by Pew Research Center claims that ⅓ of Americans say 
they often see made-up political news online while 51% say they see inaccurate 
news. However, Americans express a fair amount of confidence in their own 
ability to detect fake news (84% feeling somewhat or very confident). Some 
respondents (23%) in this report even admitted to having shared a made-up 
news story (14% say they shared a story they knew that was fake while 16% only 
found out later).  
 In a 2016 report by Gallop, trust in mass media hit an all-time low at 32% 
compared to 53% in 1997. The largest decrease is among Republicans at 14% 
compared to 41% in 1997. Democrats seem to be more stable with 51% 
compared to 64% in 1997. The decline of trust in media over time can also be 
explained generationally. Gallup found that trust has declined mainly among the 
younger generation. This makes sense as it’s the younger generation that 
presumably is more exposed to the changes in the media information 
environment including fake news. 
 There also is a partisan divide on perceptions of the accuracy of social 
media. As shown in the Gallup poll where Republicans are particularly lacking in 
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trust in media, they are also more likely than Democrats to believe that the news 
on social media is largely inaccurate (Pew Research Center 2018). Alternatively, 
Democrats are more likely to say that social media has helped them understand 
current events than Republicans (Pew Research Center 2018).  Republicans are 
also much more likely than Democrats to say that media does not keep political 
leaders accountable, that national news organizations are not trustworthy, and 
that national news media does a good job at keeping the public informed (Pew 
Research Center 2018). Some of these questions go all the way back to 1985 
suggesting that this divide has never been wider.  
Yet research does not suggest that Republicans or conservatives use 
social media any less than Democrats. Both partisan groups show a similar 
likelihood to engage in content on social media (Pew Research Center 2016). In 
fact, a question in the 2016 ANES asked respondents how many numbers of 
days in the week that was used on social media to learn about Presidential 
debates, and the data show that there is virtually no difference between 
Democrats (M = 3.7 days, SD = 3.40) and Republicans (M = 3.7 days, SD = 
3.34), t(3667) = -1.52, p = n.s.  The 2016 ANES also asked about the 
respondent’s usage of Facebook where 58% of Republicans and 57% 
Democrats claimed to have used Facebook in the past month. The culmination of 
this data suggests that although Republicans and Democrats seem to use social 
media similarly, their feelings towards the media are vastly different. Later, I will 
argue that the way partisans process information from social media differs as 
well. 
 
Fake News and the 2016 Election 
 
While fake news has been around for decades, it became a much 
discussed phenomenon in the 2016 election. Fake news in the past year has 
taken on a new meaning. During the 2016 election, there were multiple fake 
news sites that disguised themselves as reliable news sources. These fake news 
sites created articles that had no factual basis but found a welcoming audience 
among readers with compatible ideological and partisan world views. These 
articles were then spread throughout the Internet and social media. The goal of 
these websites is most likely to increase traffic and therefore, increase revenue 
for the owners. Multiple journalists attempted to track down the origin and 
creators of the fake news websites. WIRED published a piece on a small town 
called Veles in Macedonia where people made a living off of writing fake news 
articles. Prior to the election, the people of Veles would create websites that 
featured false headlines on topics like diets, cars, and sports. However, with the 
2016 election this group of people found politics to be a particularly lucrative 
topic.  One man told WIRED that he earned almost $16,000 in four months on 
two pro-Trump websites. Another fake news site based out of Los Angeles told 
NPR that he made between $10,000 to $30,000 a month. And another based in 
the country, Georgia, told the New York Times that his pro-Trump fake news 
sites that contained a mixture of real to fake news were a “gold mine”.   Needless 
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to say, the fake news business can be lucrative. 
 Craig Silverman, a journalist who often reports on false information and 
media errors, did a report using Facebook data showing the change in news 
engagement in the three months leading up to the election. As shown in Figure 1, 
his analysis found that the number of fake news articles that were garnering 
attention skyrocketed in the three months before the election. One of the stories 
published by a Macedonian fake news site falsely claims that Clinton was about 
to be indicted just 4 days before the election and claimed a spot in the top 10 
most popular stories on Facebook.  
 
Figure 1. Total Facebook Engagement for Top 20 Election Stories 
 
 
Source: Facebook Data via BuzzfeedNews 
 
 The main concern about fake news in the 2016 election was whether it 
had any impact on the outcome. Did it change people’s vote? Allcott and 
Gentzkow (2018) did an analysis of the articles leading up to the election and 
found that Pro-Trump fake news articles were shared over 3 times more than 
Pro-Clinton fake news articles. However, they find that it’s improbable that social 
media and fake news had a substantial effect on the outcome of the 2016 
election. Allcott and Gentzkow (2018) find that even if fake news had the same 
effect as a TV campaign ad, the change in vote shares would still be much 
smaller than Trump’s margin of victory. Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) found 
that 1 and 4 Americans visited a fake news website between October 7th and 
November 14th, 2016. However, they also found it was mostly driven by a small 
group of frequent visitors. These studies suggest that it’s unlikely that the 
exposure and consumption of fake news was a deciding factor in the 2016 
election. Nevertheless, fake news may have had other important consequences, 
some of which I will explore here.  
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Big Data and Fake News 
 
 Following the 2016 election, much of the research surrounding fake news 
relied on big data. The questions became more about figuring out just how 
prominent fake news is in the information environment. One of the ways that fake 
news is able to propagate so quickly online is through the use of automated 
accounts or better known as bots. In 2016, a staggering 9-15% of all active 
Twitter accounts were actually bots (Varol et al. 2017). Shao et al. (2018) 
analyzed 14 million Twitter messages that were spreading 400 thousand fake 
news articles during 2016 to see the effect of bots on the spread of fake news. 
The authors found that bots participate early on in the start of spreading fake 
news articles as well as target influential people (i.e. those with a high number of 
followers). Twitter accounts that spread these fake news articles are significantly 
more likely to be bots than real humans (Shao et al. 2018). 
 Big data is also used to explore the prominence of “echo chambers” on 
social media. The same study from Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) mentioned 
previously found that many of those that consume fake news are among a small 
group of people on social media that create these “echo chambers”.  Studying 
hundreds of thousands of Facebook users, researchers find that users can be 
highly polarized creating “echo chambers” that are difficult to penetrate, 
especially in a political context (Quattrociocchi, Scala, and Sunstein 2016).  
What’s more is that false news diffuses faster into the information environment 
than factual news (Vogoushi, Roy, and Aral 2018). In a massive study by 
Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) looking at 126,000 rumors spread by over 3 
million people between 2006 to 2017 they found that people were more likely to 
share and spread fake news over news coming from a credible source. 
 
The Believability of Fake News 
 
 Recent research provides ample evidence that fake news is now a 
common form of media woven into the fabric of our information environment. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to take a different approach to studying fake news. 
Rather than the top-down approach, I set out to start from the bottom. I look at 
the susceptibility and motivation to believing fake news starting from an individual 
level.  In Chapter 2, I pose two rival theories on the motivation behind believing in 
fake news. Are people motivated by accuracy or their own biases? In Chapter 3, I 
take a deeper dive in exploring the role of partisanship and its effects on the 
believability of fake news. In Chapter 4, I explore different individual 
characteristics that may moderate one’s susceptibility to fake news. Lastly, in 
Chapter 5, I discuss my results and its implications as well as provide a roadmap 
for future work. 
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Chapter 2: Motivated Reasoning and Fake News 
 
 All reasoning is motivated (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
Psychologists and political scientists have both identified that there are two ways 
in which reasoning is motivated. People can be motivated by accuracy where 
their goal is to reach a conclusion that is accurate, or at least the best possible 
(Baumeister and Newman 1994; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Alternatively, people 
can be directionally motivated where the goal is to rationalize or reason in 
defense of their own priors or biases (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Taber and 
Lodge 2006). The latter, in a partisan context, is also known as partisan 
motivated reasoning.  
 According to Lodge and Taber (2000), people go through stages, largely 
unconsciously, of combining a spontaneous affective response with past 
information to produce an evaluation. Keeping that in mind, often times when 
people are faced with a news article it usually contains new information. 
Considering that the news is about current events and continually changing, 
people process it differently based on their goals. 
 
Accuracy Motivated Reasoning 
 
 When people are motivated to be accurate, people look at relevant 
information more deeply and use more energy and effort to reason (Kunda 
1990). Rather than searching for information that confirms one’s beliefs, people 
look at information that is issue-related and could potentially use more complex 
ways of processing in order to decide their beliefs or make a decision. In fact, 
when the goal to be accurate is strong enough, it can overcome potential biases 
and shortcuts. For example, justices can overcome their own personal biases in 
order to achieve “legal accuracy” when deciding cases (Baum 1999; Braman and 
Nelson 2007). 
 Processing information quickly can lead to a number of errors and biases 
(Kunda 1990). People usually rely on information shortcuts when there is not 
much at stake and can come to a resolution quickly. However, there are 
instances that show that these shortcuts can lead to mistakes. Dancey and 
Sheagley (2013) show that people who rely on party cues to know the way their 
senator votes often times get the vote choice wrong when senators vote against 
their party. We know throughout the course of our daily experiences of decision 
making that we can judge things incorrectly and often because we did not pay 
close enough attention.  
Research that studies motivated reasoning have come up with various 
ways to motivate accuracy. Respondents in experiments where they are learning 
new information have been told that they must “view information in an 
evenhanded way so that they could explain the issue to other students” (Taber 
and Lodge 2006, 759) or to consider different perspectives because they will 
have to justify their reasons later (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014) as ways of 
inducing motivated reasoning. When the goal is accuracy, results show that 
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respondents are significantly more likely to spend more time on assessing the 
information, more likely to ignore cues, and less likely to give confirming 
information more weight (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Chaiken and Eagly 
1989; Kunda 1990; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
 
Directional/Partisan Motivated Reasoning 
 
By default, people tend to be motivated by their biases and want to 
safeguard their views. People want to reinforce their existing feelings rather than 
revisiting new information (Redlawsk 2002). It’s not the case that people want to 
be irrational or incorrect but that they draw conclusions that are desirable for 
themselves (Kunda 1990). Even when people can agree on a set of facts, the 
takeaway or the processing of those facts depend on their predispositions. For 
example, a survey asking about the British national economy found that British 
citizens agreed that economic conditions had worsened between 2004 to 2010 
but the reasoning and the level of responsibility of the government varied by the 
respondent’s feelings about the party in power (Bisgaard 2015). 
Often times, directional reasoning is the easier way of processing 
information. People’s beliefs and predispositions can become helpful and easily 
identifiable cues in the attitude creating and decision-making process. 
Uninformed individuals use heuristics to understand political concepts and events 
that they may find too complicated or uninteresting. Cognitive heuristics and cues 
are found time and time again to be beneficial in many situations where decision 
making may be challenging (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2001). In Chaiken’s (1980) 
model of information processing, heuristics are used when people are exerting 
minimal energy in making a decision. The default is to use heuristic processing 
since its rather efficient and can get often get people to an outcome that 
resembles one that would have been arrived at had she engaged the subject 
matter (Lupia 1994). Often times, the types of heuristics that are used for this 
processing are ones that are biased. 
In political science, the motivation is often a partisan bias. Even with a 
decision as important as voting, we often lean on our partisanship to tell us who 
and what to vote for (Bartels 2000). In numerous cases, respondents have been 
shown to be more likely to believe a frame or story because it was promoted by 
their party (Goren, Frederico, and Kittilson 2009; Kam 2005; Nicholson 2011, 
2012; Slothuus and de Vreese 2009). Whether it be a lack of effortful thinking or 
a strong bias, the majority of decisions that are made rely on our predispositions. 
 
 
 
 
Information Processing in the Evaluation of News  
 
 People use heuristics and cues everyday as a tool to efficiently navigate 
different information environments, especially ones that they are uncertain about. 
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In politics, cues are often relied upon to help us form attitudes about things like 
policies (Mondak 1993; Nicholson 2011, 2012) and also to shape our decisions 
like vote choice (Dancey & Sheagley 2013).  Reading the news is no different. 
We rely on simple shortcuts, like knowing the name of the news organization, to 
quickly decide what materials to expose ourselves to. With the increase in not 
only fake news, but news in general, it’s become even more daunting to choose 
the right information.  
Many studies have been conducted to identify what situations evoke 
different information processes and types of reasoning.  For example, Bolsen, 
Druckman, and Cook (2014) expose respondents to energy policies, most of 
which people have not heard of. In their experiment, they find that left to their 
own devices, people will engage in motivated reasoning and find cues (when 
available) that signal whether or not this information is something that fits in their 
original set of already believed convictions. However, when they told 
respondents that they will need to explain this information later on, inducing the 
accuracy motivation, respondents did not rely on partisan cues for their 
evaluation and did not engage in motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, and 
Cook 2014). Similarly, an experimental study by Peterson, Skov, Serritzlew, and 
Ramsøy (2012) looks specifically at party cues to see if people are processing it 
heuristically or through motivational processes. Using response latency as the 
measure, they find that when people are forming opinions, they are not using 
party cues as a quick heuristic to get by but as a tool for more effortful motivated 
reasoning (Peterson et al. 2012). These studies provide some insight on how the 
outcome is entirely dependent on the motivation. 
In evaluating new information, it’s not so much whether people are 
engaging in heuristic processing or not but the motivation behind what cues to 
use. Based on the information processing literature, people will use different cues 
depending whether they are motivated by being accurate or by their own biases. 
 When exposed to fake news, people will have to make the decision on 
whether or not to believe this information. I suggest two alternative theories in the 
believability of fake news. Presumably, if someone was motivated by accuracy, 
people will be aware of the cues that signal whether or not the information is 
credible. Alternatively, those who are motivated by their biases will simply believe 
or not believe the article depending on whether or not it aligns with their beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivated Reasoning and Fake News 
 
Accuracy Motivated Reasoning and the Believability of Fake News 
 
Being that most people are not pundits, the use of heuristics is ubiquitous 
in politics.  Many people form political opinions or make political decisions 
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despite having little to no political knowledge. Much of political science research 
has put heuristics in a positive light for helping people making decisions that are 
aligned with their preferences even though they are largely uninformed about the 
substance (Boudreau 2009; Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 
1991; Sniderman 2000; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). But heuristics are 
not 100% full proof; they can cause problems as well. Some heuristics can be 
misleading or turn out to be wrong, leading to bad decisions (Kuklinski and Quirk 
2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Dancey & Sheagley 2012; Nicholson 2012). 
When it comes to media and heuristics, the decisions that need to be 
made are typically whether to read an article and then whether to believe it.  In 
the past, someone could potentially sift through all the media options available 
and make an informed decision on what to read and believe but now, that is 
impossible. Today, there are exponentially more options and outlets. Now, 
people are unintentionally exposed to multiple news articles through social media 
and need shortcuts to decide what is relevant and trustworthy. There are 
numerous cues that are available in a news article, particularly online, that can 
help inform this decision. These cues include, but are not limited to, news 
organization source cue (e.g. Turner 2007), partisan cue (e.g. Goren, Federico, 
and Kittilson 2009; Nicholson 2012), time/date cue (e.g. Winter & Kramer 2014), 
number of circulations cue (e.g. Sundar, Knobloch-Westerwisck & Hastall 2006), 
or social media cue (e.g. Westerman, Spence, Van Der Heide 2014). All of these 
cues provide quick bits of information that can help people assess whether the 
article is worth reading and whether it’s worth believing. 
 
Source Cues 
 
 The source of information is among the most commonly used type of cue. 
Source cue, widely defined, simply tells you where information comes from - 
what the source of the information is. In political science, source cue often means 
“the political actor behind the issue” (Nicholson 2011). This can be a type of 
person, group of people, specific person, organization, political party, news 
organization, etc. Political scientists have shown time and again that source cues 
are instrumental to shaping public opinion (Arceneaux 2008; Arceneaux and 
Kolodny 2009; Boudreau 2009; Bowler and Donovan 1998; Carmines and 
Stimson 1989; Clark and Kastellec 2015; Druckman 2001a; Goren, Federico, and 
Kittilson 2009; Kam 2005; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; 
Lupia 1994; Mondak 1993a, 1993b; Nicholson 2011, 2012; Sniderman, Brody, 
and Tetlock 1991). For example, Mondak (1993) finds that when President 
Reagan is included as a source cue in a question about a policy, the response of 
the participant is guided by their feelings towards him.  
 With media research, source cues can mean something different. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, source cues refer to the source or the publication 
that the news article is from. Media studies usually focus on the credibility of the 
source (Druckman 2011). In social psychology and communication, credibility 
has long been perceived as an attribute of the source that can influence the 
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reader’s response to the message (Kiousis & Dimitrova 2006; Tormala, Briñol, 
and Petty 2007).  
 The credibility of a source cue can affect the selection of news sites and 
whether the news they report is to be believed. On selective exposure, Sundar, 
Knobloch-Westerwick, Hastall (2007) found that participants had a greater 
likelihood of clicking an article if it was attached to a reputable source. Content 
that is relevant (Pirolli & Card 1999) and consistent with a person’s attitudes 
(Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng 2009) play a role in information seeking as well, 
but when content is held constant, articles from reputable sources are shown to 
be “selected more frequently, read for longer, and selected earlier” (Winter & 
Krämer 2014).  Other research also suggests that cues about the reputation of a 
source are important when processing information (Pornpitakpan 2004) and that 
credibility is necessary for a person to make any use of the information (Wathen 
and Burkell 2002).  
 When it comes to believing the information, source cues can also be 
integral. In communication literature, a credible source cue can trigger something 
called the authority heuristic (Sundar 2008). The authority heuristic is the belief 
that reputable and credible sources have correct information (Sundar 2008). 
Furthermore, sources that are seen as trustworthy are generally more likely to 
persuade readers (Pornpitakpan 2004).  There are also a few papers in political 
science that have similar findings. Druckman (2001a) replicates the foundational 
framing study by Nelson et al. (1997a) about the KKK rally but also adds the 
source to the stimuli, which was not included in the original study. Source 
credibility in Druckman’s paper (2001a) is treated as moderating variable for 
framing effects with the hypothesis being that a frame is only successful if the 
speaker is credible. The article is about a Ku Klux Klan’s request to hold a rally, 
and the article’s perspective is either a free speech perspective or a public safety 
perspective. Respondents see that these articles either come from the New York 
Times (credible source) or The National Enquirer (noncredible source). 
Druckman (2001a) found that those who saw the article from The National 
Enquirer showed no difference between the two frames, but respondents who 
received the New York Times treatment were swayed by the stories. This finding, 
and many others, suggests that sources play a role in whether the news is to be 
believed. 
 
Directional/Partisan Motivated Reasoning and the Believability of Fake News 
 
When people are told something, their default is to believe that it is true. If 
after leaving a restaurant a person you do not know tells you that you left your 
wallet at the restaurant, the default is to believe them.  Recognizing or suspecting 
something to be false takes attention and effort (Lewandosky et al. 2012). The 
natural and, most importantly, easier option (in the immediate) is to believe. The 
ability to recognize information as false is cognitively taxing. It takes an active 
mind and relative interest to be suspicious. Information that is consistent with 
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your views and beliefs should then be easy to accept (and information that is 
inconsistent easy to reject).  
This “cognitive-consistency” perspective (Wyer 1974; Festinger 1957) 
posits that compatibility with your viewpoints increases chances of acceptance 
while incompatibility decreases it. The motivation and cognitive resources 
necessary to carefully assess compatibility is also greater than accepting it on 
the spot (Lewandosky et al. 2012). Furthermore, the incompatibility between a 
piece of information and your worldview can elicit negative emotional responses 
(Festinger 1957).  The culmination of all of this provides some insight into why it 
might be easy to fall into the trap of believing in fake news.  
People perceive the world in different ways, but often times, it’s perceived 
in a way that’s reaffirms their beliefs. Researchers have time and time again 
shown that partisans weigh information consistent with their existing beliefs 
heavier than contradictory information (e.g. Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2013). 
Partisanship provides a directional goal for reasoning and furthermore, can serve 
as a “more general motivational mechanism that guides processing that is 
consistent” with political attitudes (Strickland, Taber, and Lodge 2011). Even 
when partisans agree on a fact, when given an outcome like opinion formation or 
candidate evaluation, they will still find a way to allow their biases to shine 
through (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines 2007). 
The partisan nature of fake news lends itself to people’s emotions, and the 
reason why partisan motivated reasoning works so well is the deeply ingrained, 
emotional attachment to parties (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Theodoridis 2017). 
People want to align with their party. It’s easier, and it feels better. The 
acceptance of conflicting information requires an update to prior beliefs, which 
requires a lot of effort.  
Information environments have a large role to play in this as well and are 
known to affect the way people politically learn (e.g. Barabas and Jerit 2009; 
Nicholson 2003). With the Internet and social media and the proliferation of fake 
news, the information environment has changed. People are being inundated 
with more information, especially mistruths, and the ability to be accurate may be 
getting harder. Even brief exposure to a variety of news articles from Internet 
searches (e.g. Google Search) signaled to people to engage in motivated 
reasoning (Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson, and Westerwick 2015). 
The Internet and social media have also created “echo chambers” for like-
minded partisans to gather and be reaffirm their political views and values 
(Sunstein 2001a, b, 2007; Pariser 2011).  One study found that Facebook users 
can be highly polarized and that these political echo chambers are particularly 
difficult to penetrate (Quattrociocchi, Scala & Sunstein 2016). Even though 
people may not know each other in real life, in the social media world they are 
sorting themselves by primarily talking to those with similar ideological 
preferences (Barbera, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, and Bonneau 2015). This is the kind 
of information environment that partisans are in and is arguably contributing to 
the polarization of the masses (Settle 2018).  
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Source Cues, Party Cues, and Fake News 
 
Source Cues and Fake News 
 
How persuasive are source cues? There are a variety of outcome or 
dependent variables used to test the influence of source cues such as 
believability, trustworthiness, or change in attitude; but conceptually, it boils down 
to persuasion. As shown above, research suggests that a credible source cue 
can be very persuasive. A staggering number of communication articles found 
that a highly credible source is significantly more persuasive in changing 
attitudes than a low credibility source (Horai, Naccari, & Fatoullah 1974; Johnson 
& Izzett 1969; Johnson, Torvicia, & Poprick 1968; Lirtzman & Shuv-Ami 1986; 
Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Miller & Baseheart, 1969; 
Ross 1973; Schulman & Worrall 1970; Warren 1969; Watts & McGuire 1964; 
Whittaker & Meade 1968). Alternatively, when participants are told that the 
source should not be trusted, persuasion is inhibited (Petty and Cacioppo 1979).  
In looking at the media, the trustworthiness of the source goes hand in 
hand with the credibility of the source. Across multiple mediums (television, radio, 
newspaper), a trustworthy source is found to be more persuasive than the 
untrustworthy source (Andreoli and Worchel 1978; Worchel, Andreoli and Eason 
1975). In some cases, the persuasion of the source cue can be even larger than 
the content itself. Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) find that as respondents read 
product messages, they were influenced not by the message by solely by the 
source credibility. 
When it comes to fake news, sources can be split into two groups: familiar 
sources and unfamiliar sources. Sources that are familiar are usually part of the 
mainstream media and are generally viewed as credible (Pornpitakpan 2004). 
Aside from the select few exceptions (such as Breitbart or National Enquirer), the 
majority of well-known media names are reputable sources. Going back to Lazer 
et al’s. (2018) definition of fake news, these fabricated news sources don’t have 
an organizational process with editors and fact checkers that go through the 
content of their articles. 
Unfamiliar sources are where there is more confusion. It’s possible for 
credible and reputable news sources to be incorrectly categorized with fake news 
sites. While source cues can be informative, there is often no way of knowing 
whether the unknown source is a fake news site or a credible site. Therefore, 
there is always an inherent risk to the reader that the article can contain false 
information if it’s coming from an unfamiliar news source. In this circumstance, a 
reader would have to use other cues to determine the credibility of the story. 
 One of the things that comes with the territory of being a mainstream news 
site is that it’s very difficult to be perceived as unbiased. The majority of 
mainstream media can be seen as being more sympathetic towards one ideology 
versus another depending on who you ask. With unfamiliar news sources, there 
are no preconceived notions unless the unfamiliar news source contains a party 
cue. Often times, depending on the type of fake news site, many of the names 
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will contain a clue (sometimes glaringly obvious) which way a fake news site 
leans ideologically.  In situations where party or ideological cues are available, 
the political leanings of the news site become salient. To my knowledge, this is 
the first study exploring the effect of source cues with unfamiliar fake news, some 
of which embed clues to the political leanings of the source. This leads me to the 
following prediction. 
 
Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis: Individuals who are motivated by 
accuracy will be more likely to find stories coming from familiar sources as 
more believable than stories coming from sources that are unknown   
 
Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis (B): Among stories whose source is 
unfamiliar, individuals who are motivated by accuracy will be more likely to 
find stories coming from a nonpartisan unfamiliar source to be more 
believable than stories coming from partisan unfamiliar sources. 
 
It’s important to note that I expect these hypotheses to be moderated by 
partisanship. A survey experiment found that Fox News and CNN contain an 
ideological cue simply in the name itself and that these signals are most 
pronounced among ideologues (Turner 2007). The ideological leaning of a news 
source is somewhat subjective in that some may find some sources unbiased 
while other find it biased. A partisan or ideological cue embedded in the name of 
the news source provides insight into the politics of the source and, for partisans, 
whether the news is believable or not. For example, in this context, a Democrat 
might find Fox News the least credible news source out there in comparison to 
any other news sources, familiar or unfamiliar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partisan Motivated Reasoning and Fake News 
 
On the other hand, partisan biases are very persuasive as well. There are 
numerous instances where in comparison to other cues, partisan cues tend to 
outweigh all else (e.g. Hansford and Coe 2018; Cohen 2003; Popkin 1991; Rahn 
1993; Zaller 1992). When people are exposed to news articles, especially on 
social media, it’s most likely the case that they simply see a headline, the source 
of the article, a picture, and perhaps one or two sentences giving the gist of what 
you might find the article. The person motivated by their biases would ignore any 
signals about the credibility of the article and instead rely on any information in 
the headline or text that give them an understanding of whether or not this article 
aligns with their viewpoints.  
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A recent study found that 59% of all links shared on social media aren’t 
actually being read by those who are sharing it (Gabielkov, Ramachandran, 
Chaintreau, and Legout (2016). People are just reading the headlines and 
sharing the article based on what they find in the headline. Multiple news sources 
tested this in their own ways by creating articles with enticing headlines and 
content that had nothing to do with the headline itself. Many of these articles 
found that they were able to garner thousands of likes and shares on social 
media platforms. To share something would insinuate that a person may believe 
the information that’s being presented in a headline to be credible. Furthermore, 
people are more likely to like and share headlines that are attune with their 
predispositions hence the exasperated problem of echo chambers. This leads 
me to the alternative following predictions. 
 
Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis: Individuals who are motivated 
by their own biases will rely on any partisan cues in the headline (and 
other text) to determine the believability of the article.  
 
It’s expected that Republicans and Democrats who are exposed to the same 
story would have opposite reactions to the believability of the article. In 
comparison to the accuracy motivation hypotheses, those motivated by their 
biases would ignore source cues and base their judgment of the article solely on 
their partisanship. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A nationally representative sample of U.S. adults in July 2018 completed 
an online questionnaire (N = 1220). The sample was obtained from Survey 
Sample International (SSI) which recruits and maintains a survey panel of more 
than 600,000 Internet users. Participants were chosen from a sample frame that 
closely mirror U.S. census data. Descriptive statistics showed respondents were 
73% White, 14% Black, 12% Hispanic, 5% Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2% Native 
American/Other. The average age of respondents was 47.34 years (SD = 15.78) 
and 55% are female and 45% are male. All of these statistics are from self-
reported data. SSI also had this information for respondent and screening.  
Partisanship is measured using a standard branching question from the 
larger survey to measure party identification, which first asks participants whether 
they identify as Republican, Democratic, or Independent. If participants answered 
“Independent,” a follow up question is asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer 
to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?” If participants answered 
“Republican or Democrat,” a follow up question is asked: “Do you think of 
yourself as a Strong Democrat/Republican or a Not so Strong 
Democrat/Republican?” Respondents who selected Democrat or Republican to 
the follow up question for Independents are then labeled as a leaner partisans 
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since they are shown to be attitudinally similar to partisans (Keith et al. 1992).  In 
the sample, there are 164 Independents (13%), 581 Democrats (48%), and 475 
Republicans (39%).  
 
Design 
 
The study begins with a survey experiment.7  The experiment consists of 
nine news stories and seven news sources. Each participant receives all nine 
news stories and for each news story, there is one of seven news sources that 
might be included through random assignment. While each participant only sees 
each news story once, he or she will see a few news sources more than once. 
The news sources range in type. There are two mainstream partisan news 
sources (Fox and CNN), one well known partisan fake news source (Breitbart)8, 
two fake news sources that contain partisan cues (Conservative Frontline and 
Liberal American), one fake news (and unfamiliar) source with no partisan 
apparent partisan or ideological cue (USANews365), and one of the legacy, 
mainstream news sources intended as a baseline (ABC News).  
The randomization in this research design is two-fold. First, participants are 
randomly assigned to the order in which they see each news story. Second, 
within each news story, participants are randomly assigned to what news source 
the story is coming from. For every story, there are about 164-185 respondents 
that saw it with each source.9 Figure 2 shows an example of what participants 
saw on their screens. The stimuli mimics what one would see in a Facebook 
feed. As is shown in Figure 2, the source cue is shown twice, once at the top with 
the logo and once at the bottom with the name of the link. There is a blurb at the 
top above the picture and then there is a headline with a short snippet of 
information. For each story, there are essentially 7 versions of the stimuli where 
the only difference is the source.  
 
 
Figure 2. Example of Experimental Stimuli 
 
                                               
7 A series of questions that identify individual traits follow the survey experiment and will 
be addressed in the next chapter. 
8 Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of Breitbart on the Democratic side. Breitbart has 
notoriety and is considered a source that churns many fake news stories according to 
Snopes and Politifact. While there are many liberal fake news sites, they are not well 
known and therefore, cannot be a direct counterpart to Breitbart. 
9 One out of the nine stories is split into two stories. They are the same story with two 
opposing views. One headline reads “Trump Speaks to Empty Seats in Charlotte, NC” 
and the other headline reads “Trump Speaks to Filled Seats in Charlotte, NC.” For this 
condition, respondents are randomly assigned into one of the two stories and the sample 
is split in half. 
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Note: This is one of the stories that was shown to respondents. This was designed to be 
the nonpolitical headline. 
 
Sources 
 
 Respondents were also asked (after the experiment) about their familiarity 
and their perceived credibility of these news sources. Prior to the study, I asked 
respondents to report which news sources they were familiar with. I clarified that 
they do not have to be a subscriber or an avid reader of the source, just familiar. 
 
 
Table 1. Familiarity of News Sources by Partisanship 
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Note: Percentages are a combination of responses of those who responded saying 
“Very Familiar” and “Somewhat Familiar” 
 
Table 1 shows respondent’s familiarity with news sources.10 
Unsurprisingly, CNN, ABC News, and Fox News are the top 3 most familiar news 
sources across all partisan groups.11 30% of respondents reported they were 
familiar with Breitbart, an increase from 2015 where awareness was at 15% (Pew 
Research Center 2015).  Interestingly, there is a noticeable difference between 
Democrats and Republicans even in familiarity for lesser known, more partisan 
sources. Democrats are more familiar of the Rachel Maddow show by 10% while 
Republicans are more familiar with The Sean Hannity Show by 14%. 
Republicans and Democrats also are more familiar with the majority of news 
sources in comparison to Independents.  
In a follow up question, respondents were asked about the credibility of a 
subset of new sources, ones they had claimed to be familiar with. On a four-point 
likert scale, respondents were asked to rate from 1 (Not Credible) to 4 (Credible) 
the credibility of 8 news sources. If respondents were unfamiliar with all eight of 
these sources, they did not see this question. Table 2 shows the top 2 scores 
(Credible and Somewhat Credible) for the eight news sources. The stark 
difference between partisans and their rating of source credibility is apparent. 
Democrats found Republican news sources less credible than Republicans found 
Democratic news sources. In other words, the range across sources for 
Democrats is wider.  The smallest difference between Democrat and Republican 
                                               
10 The full list of sources and familiarity ratings can be found in the Appendix. 
11 I also included the fake news sites that were included in the survey experiment. Less 
than 5% of respondents claimed to know the fake news sources used in the study 
(Liberal American, Conservative Frontline, USANews365). 
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is with NPR, a 27% difference. The largest difference is with The Rachel Maddow 
show where 59% more Democrats thought it was credible than Republicans. This 
is greater than the 48% difference with Breitbart. Focusing on CNN and Fox 
News, both news sources included in the survey experiment, around 45% are 
seen as “credible” or “somewhat credible” from respondents of the opposing 
party.  
 
 
Table 2. Credibility of News Sources by Partisanship 
 
 
Note: Percentages are a combination of responses of those who responded saying 
“Credible” and “Somewhat Credible”. 
All proportional differences between Democrats and Republicans are statistically 
significant at the p < .01 level. 
 
The data in Table 2 suggest that the believability of news will be shaped 
by party identification. Since there are large partisan differences in the credibility 
of news sources, it is likely that we see these differences inform the believability 
of news stories. The lack of familiarity on the unknown news sources should be a 
cue that their information may not be credible, but the distrust and dislike of the 
mainstream news source that is biased towards your values could overwhelm 
such considerations. 
 Each respondent saw a total of nine headlines. The majority of headlines 
are inspired by fake news articles except for one that is intended as a baseline 
titled, “Lawmakers introduce bipartisan bill to speed up infrastructure permitting.” 
As anticipated, respondents rated this story as the most believable (M = 5.02, SD 
= 1.19). There are two stories that are fake and not overtly political. One is about 
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a conspiracy behind the Vegas shooting and the other is about the flu shot 
causing a flu epidemic. The remaining stories are political containing topics that 
range from Mexico agreeing to pay for the border wall to Barack Obama 
overseeing the separation of 89,000 immigrant children during his presidency. All 
headlines can be found in the Appendix A. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The primary dependent variable is believability and is measured with the 
following question: “How believable do you find this story?”.12 Participants can 
respond on a scale of 1 (Extremely Unbelievable (Not Believable)) to 7 
(Extremely believable). In line with the Accuracy Motivation Hypotheses, news 
stories that come from ABC News, CNN, and Fox News will be more believable 
than those that come from the other news sources. According to the 2nd Accuracy 
Motivation Hypothesis (B), the nonpartisan unfamiliar fake news source 
(USANews 365) will be more believable than those that come from partisan 
unfamiliar fake news sources (Conservative Frontline and Liberal American). All 
of this should be moderated by partisanship. For Breitbart, the believability rating 
should depend on partisanship and knowledge of Breitbart as a news source. 
Those that are familiar and identify as a Democrat may find Breitbart to be even 
less believable than Fox News. The Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis 
posits that those who are motivated by their biases will ignore any source cues 
and only be swayed by the information that is shown in the headlines and text. 
Respondents are not swayed to engage in directional or accuracy motivated 
reasoning. The experiment is designed to test which occurs without any 
incentives towards one way or another. 
 
Stories 
 
 As a reminder, each respondent sees a total of nine headlines. Table 3 
includes the headlines and the average believability ratings for Total Average, 
ABC News, and First Story.  The average believability ratings range from 2.4 to 5 
(on a 1 to 7 point scale). Some of the stories are clearly Republican or Democrat 
leaning. Two stories like the Las Vegas mass shooting story and the story about 
the flu vaccinations are fake news stories that aren’t necessarily political. Lastly, 
the story about the bipartisan bill is designed to be a political story that is not 
biased towards one party or the other and can act as a sort of a control.  
 
Table 3. Stimuli Story Headlines with Average Believability Ratings for Total, 
ABC News, and First Stimuli 
                                               
12 In a pre-test version of this experiment, two questions were tested for the dependent 
variable. Participants were asked either “How believable is this story?” or “How credible 
is this story?” Results showed that, overall, asking about credibility garnered a tougher 
evaluation than believability. 
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Note: Stimuli includes more text than the headline. Full text is included in Appendix A 
 
 In Table 3, the Total Column shows the average ratings across each story. 
The most believable story is, as intended, the nonpartisan story. The next column 
is the average ratings for those who saw the story coming from ABC News. The 
Total column and the ABC News column ratings are very similar and shows that 
ABC News can be considered a baseline that is similar to the total average. 
Lastly, the last column consists of the average ratings for all those who saw that 
story first. One of the shortcomings of this study is that it is a within subjects 
design. Treating each story and rating as an independent observation is a 
SUTVA violation. In the models later on in this dissertation, I control for possible 
ordering effects, but in this table, I also show the average rating for those who 
saw the story first. The differences between the average rating for those who saw 
the story first and the total are not very different. Overall, there is a small 
increase in believability when the story is shown first but that difference is only 
statistically significant for the story about the Las Vegas mass shooting where 
those who saw the story first (M = 4.26, SD = 2.03) were more likely to believe 
the story than those who saw it after (M = 3.89, SD = 2.00), t(1218) = -1.97 p < 
.05. 
 
Results 
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This experiment is designed to identify whether people are more likely to 
be persuaded by the source cue or the content of the article. The Accuracy 
Motivation Hypothesis expects there to be minimal differences between the 
baseline (ABC News) and the other mainstream sources when congruent with 
partisan preferences (e.g., FOX News for Republicans and CNN for Democrats). 
Recall that this hypothesis also expects that content coming from familiar 
sources will be found more believable than from unfamiliar sources. Within the 
unknown sources, Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis (B) posits that information 
from the nonpartisan unknown fake source (USANews365) would be more 
believable than in the unknown sources with partisan cues (Liberal American and 
Conservative Frontline). The Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis would 
suggest that there are minimal source cue effects and that the believability of the 
article is dependent on the article content. 
 The analyses are divided by political party because the ratings, much like 
the credibility in news sources, show stark differences between Democrats and 
Republicans. The first set of results in Figure 3 show the average believability 
ratings between the sources for all of the fake news stories (8 stories not 
including the control story about the bipartisan bill).  Figure 3B shows that there 
are no differences in believability across the various sources for Republicans. 
Figure 3A shows that there are minimal differences in believability across the 
sources for Democrats. Both CNN (M = 3.93, SD = 2.27) and ABC News (M = 
4.08, SD = 2.26) have significantly higher believability ratings than Breitbart (M = 
3.67, SD = 2.27). ABC News (M = 4.08, SD = 2.26) is also higher in believability 
ratings in comparison to Fox News (M = 3.78, SD = 2.25), Liberal American (M = 
3.72, SD = 2.27), and USANews365 (M = 3.81, SD = 2.22). The results for 
Republicans show no evidence for the Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis since 
believability scores remained constant across the different sources. For 
Democrats, there is a little evidence for the Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis that 
expects familiar sources to be more believable than unfamiliar sources where 
ABC News is more believable than Breitbart, Fox News, Liberal American, and 
USANews365. However, for both parties, there is no evidence that unfamiliar 
sources with partisan cues are less believable then unfamiliar sources without 
partisan cues.  
Figure 3. Average Believability Ratings for Fake News Articles Between Different 
Sources 
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Note: All stories are included except the control story about the bipartisan bill.  
N = 1220 
 
 The analysis in Figure 3 ignores the content of the headlines but 
aggregating all of the fake news stories together. However, the Partisan 
Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis suggests that the stories are what is most 
important in gauging believability, not the sources. Figure 4 represents the 
analysis that tests both alternative hypotheses together. For the analysis in 
Figure 4, fake news stories were split into two groups: Pro-Republican stories 
and Pro-Democrat stories. On the x-axis of Figure 4 are the partisan 
identifications of the respondent.  
Starting with testing the Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis, the dotted lines 
in Figure 4 show the variation in believability ratings across different sources. For 
example, the top blue line is the average believability ratings for Democrats 
reviewing Pro-Democrat stories and the top red line is the average believability 
ratings for Republicans reviewing Pro-Republican stories. These lines are 
relatively flat, particularly for Republicans. There are no statistically significant 
differences between sources for Republicans when looking at congruent fake 
news. For Democrats, the results are very similar. The only difference for 
Democrats that is reliable is where ABC News (M = 5.49, SD = 1.72) and CNN 
(M = 5.48, SD = 1.80) have significantly greater believability ratings than Breitbart 
(M = 4.96, SD = 2.16). 
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Similarly, looking at the bottom two lines where partisans are evaluating 
fake news articles with incongruent information, I find similar results. In this case, 
both Democrats and Republicans show no statistically significant differences in 
believability depending on the source. Even when stories are split by partisan 
leaning where source cue effects should become more apparent, there are no 
differences between sources. Figure 4 shows no evidence of the Accuracy 
Motivation Hypothesis. 
 The Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis posits that people would 
ignore source cues when faced with partisan fake news and evaluate the 
believability of the articles depending on how congruent or incongruent the 
content is to their beliefs. Figure 4 shows evidence for this hypothesis. While the 
believability ratings are rather consistent across source cues, they are vastly 
different depending on the type of story and the partisanship of the respondent. 
Looking at just the blue dots that are the Pro-Democrat fake news stories, there 
is a significant difference in the believability ratings between Democrats and 
Republicans regardless of the source cue. With the Pro-Republican fake news 
stories, the believability ratings are, on average, about a 2pt difference between 
Democrats and Republicans.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Previous research on source cues would suggest that the source of the 
information would change the way the article story is processed. In this design, 
there are two new elements in comparison to previous source cue research. For 
one, there are sources that are unfamiliar to people. The expectation was that 
the unfamiliarity of these sources would be a cue in itself that the information 
may not be reliable. Secondly, the stories themselves were less believable than 
the average story. Many of them were also partisan. The expectation was that 
there would be an interaction between the content of the stories and the different 
types of sources, some containing partisan cues and some not. The results of 
this study provide no evidence for source cue effects. This suggests that when 
people are left to their own devices in evaluating news stories, they do not have 
accuracy in mind.  
 Instead, respondents showed that their believability ratings were heavily 
influenced by the content of the information and how aligned it was with their 
priors. There is evidence in the analysis in this chapter for the Partisan Motivated 
Reasoning Hypothesis. No matter what source the story was connected with, the 
overarching drive for whether or not something was determined as believable 
was whether or not the story itself coincided with the respondent’s beliefs.  
This finding implies that people may be not be checking the sources on 
these articles as much as we thought when it comes to posts on social media, 
especially when they are being unintentionally exposed. The stimuli are easy to 
process, similar to how the same information would be presented on a social 
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media platform. Headlines could be the exact amount of information that 
someone would not mind reading and using as a tool to evaluate the news.   
Furthermore, the sensational aspect of these news stories combined with 
the political climate make for a partisan environment. In order to mimic fake news 
stories, the majority of the stories in the experiment were sensationalized. I 
expected respondents to react to these headlines with disbelief, but instead, they 
were largely driven by partisan motivated reasoning. Even in the stories that 
were less outlandish and more believable, there were minimal source effects 
signaling that the content far outweighed the source. 
 The implications of this on fake news and believability seems grim. The 
unfamiliar fake sources in combination with fake headlines did not seem to signal 
untrustworthiness more than other sources. Ideally, the unfamiliarity of the 
source would signal to people to take a closer look at the content, but this doesn’t 
seem to be the case. People seem largely motivated by their beliefs and are 
willing to believe a story that comes from an unfamiliar source if the information 
in it is congruent with their partisanship. I take a deeper look at this in the next 
chapter.   
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Chapter 3: Partisan Bias in News Evaluation 
 
 Since The American Voter, party identification has been thought of as a 
type of psychological attachment (Campbell et al. 1960). In recent years, party 
identification has also been conceptualized as a social identity (Greene 1999, 
2000, 2004; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 
2015; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Nicholson 2012; Nicholson et al. 2016; 
Theodoridis 2017). In both theories (which are not mutually exclusive), it’s easy 
to see how partisanship can be an important lens by which to view things. In 
terms of media, there are studies that show partisan differences in almost every 
aspect from types of media, media seeking behaviors, media exposure, and 
media evaluation. 
 
Partisan Bias and Media 
 
 There are multiple facets of research in partisan bias and the media. One 
avenue has found that partisans differ on how they view different news types and 
sources as credible or trustworthy. As shown in Chapter 2, there were minimal 
differences between partisans on what sources they were familiar with but there 
were significant differences in their perceptions of credibility of the sources 
(Table 3). Similarly, Settle (2018) found a clear perceived ideological bias over a 
range of news sources and this perception differed depending on whether the 
respondent was conservative or liberal. In fact, only 7.8% of those respondents 
thought that none of the thirty-six news sources had a bias (Settle 2018). 
 Perceptions of bias in the news has been shown to have little to do with 
factual or objective content and more about how political elites frame different 
news sources (Watts et al. 1999). Furthermore, this has grown into a general 
expectation of news sources and media to be bias (Baum and Gussin 2007; 
D’Alessio 2003; Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken 1994; Turner 2007). The hostile 
media effect is a theory about partisans who see the same exact news coverage 
on an issue yet find it to be biased in favor of the other side (Dalton, Beck, and 
Huckfeldt 1998; Gunther and Schmitt 2004; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985). 
For example, in a study by Coe et al. (2008), they randomly assigned 
respondents to watch liberal-leaning or conservative-leaning cable news 
programs and found that conservatives perceived more bias in liberal programs 
than liberals did and vice versa. Similarly, the hostile media effect posits that 
partisans also fail to recognize bias when news actually is bias (Feldman 2011).  
 There is also oppositional media hostility that blames ideologically biased 
news programs for increasing distrust and suspicion in the public towards media 
outlets (Arceneaux, Johnson, and Murphy 2012). This, in conjunction with 
the increase in news outlets and news mediums, are some of the mechanisms 
that underlie selective exposure.  
People have been selectively exposing themselves to different media messages 
as long as there were options (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944).  Now as 
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media options continuously increase, people have a tendency to choose 
ideologically congruent news (Stroud 2008; Arceneuax and Johnson 2013).  
 Selective exposure is happening not only at the level of cable news and 
television but with the Internet and social media as well. The echo chambers, that 
have been discussed in the previous chapters, are a product of people 
consistently self-selecting into ideologically congruent news on social media 
(Sunstein 2001a, b, 2007; Pariser 2011). In a clever design by Henderson and 
Theodoridis (2017), they had respondents engaging in what looked like a 
YouTube type platform where they were shown campaign ads from the 2012 
presidential election. Respondents were then able to skip if they did not want to 
see the campaign ad. Henderson and Theodoridis (2017) found that partisans 
skip ads that are of the out-party showing evidence for selective exposure even 
at the online advertisement level. 
Out of all of this research, the most important factor to consider is 
partisanship. Partisanship plays a significant role in one’s assessment of bias in 
the media (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985). 
Partisanship is also a key driver in selectivity of media (Arceneaux and Johnson 
2013; Henderson and Theodoridis 2017). The reason for this is that partisans are 
seeing the world through their lenses. This partisan perceptual bias is way in 
which partisans evaluate parties, candidates, and news (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Jerit and Barabas 2012; Theodoridis 2017). People can interpret the same piece 
of fact or evidence to be different based on their party identification (Bisgaard 
2015; Gerber and Green 1999; Goggin and Theodoridis 2018). 
 
Partisan Bias and Fake News 
 
This is all in line with the partisan motivated reasoning literature. Partisans 
are evaluating the news and selecting the news based on whether or not it aligns 
with their beliefs. The previous chapter showed that people’s partisanship was 
first in line for consideration when evaluating fake news. The stories included in 
the analysis had a clear alignment with Democrats or Republicans, but they were 
not similar to each other in content or language. In this next analysis, I intend on 
taking a deeper dive into the role partisanship plays in the evaluation of fake 
news when more is kept constant.   
I am also looking for evidence of the Accuracy Motivation Hypothesis 
(individuals who are motivated by accuracy will be more likely to find stories 
coming from familiar sources as more believable than stories coming from 
sources that are unknown) in this chapter. With the stories being less politically 
charged than the other headlines, it could be the case that source cues become 
more relevant. 
As described in the last chapter, Partisan Motivated Reasoning 
Hypothesis posits that those who are motivated by their biases will ignore any 
source cues and only be swayed by the information that is shown in the 
headlines and text. The same hypothesis remains for this chapter. A secondary 
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expectation is that Democrats and Republicans will evaluate the believability of 
fake news to a significant extent.  
 
Table 4. Believability of News Stories by Party Identification 
 
 
Note: “Y” means yes, the difference between Democrats and Republicans is statistically 
significant and “N” means the different is not statistically significant 
 
Table 4 shows a within story analysis and displays that there is a 
statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans for each 
story except for the control story about the bipartisan bill. This table provides 
evidence for a strong partisan bias effect. The story about the Mexico paying for 
the border wall is rated as the least believable for both partisan groups and was 
indeed intended to be the quintessential fake news story that should sound alarm 
bells for how far-fetched it is.13 Nevertheless, Republicans (M = 2.98, SD = 2.06) 
found this story to be more believable than Democrats by a whole point (M = 
1.93, SD = 1.76) providing support for partisan motivated reasoning, t(1054) = -
8.97, p < .01. Although the story is rated low in believability by both parties 
                                               
13 This story comes from a “real” fake news story from the Conservative Tree House and 
was reposted on Twitter and Reddit. It was shared over 6,000 times on Facebook. (Link: 
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/2018/04/17/breaking-mexico-agrees-to-pay-for-
wall-offering-emergency-deal-to-close-nafta-tariff-loophole/) 
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(under 4), the headline stating an outcome that would be positive for 
conservatives is enough for some Republicans to find it more believable than 
Democrats. This particular story highlights a situation where a fake news article 
is enticing because it is aligned with political identity and beliefs. Generally, the 
differences between Democrats and Republicans are in the direction that is 
expected from reading the headlines.  
 
Empty or Filled? 
 
The titles in Table 4 show that these headlines are motivated by 
partisanship. To examine the role of partisanship in the believability in fake news 
headlines, I examined the story about Trump speaking to filled/empty seats.14 As 
is shown in Figure 5, the stories are identical except one headline says that 
Trump spoke to empty seats while the other says he spoke to filled seats. 
Compared to some of the other headlines, this story is less sensationalized and 
yet these stories clearly display how strong the partisan differences are.  
 
Figure 5: Stimuli Example of Empty vs Filled Headlines 
 
  
                                               
14 Neither of these stories were included in the analysis in Chapter 2, Figure 4. 
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Note: Respondents only saw one of the stimuli: empty or filled. The source was 
randomized between the seven sources. 
 
 The purpose of this analysis is to see the effects of partisan bias while 
holding everything else constant. While the analyses previously looking at pro-
Republican and pro-Democrat fake news are similar, there are no two articles 
that are as similar to each other. In sum, I created these news stories to eliminate 
as much noise as possible.  
 
Results 
 
For these results, I take a deeper dive into partisanship and look at 
believability of these two similar yet opposing headlines. Figure 6 displays 
average believability ratings by story, between Democrats and Republicans, by 
sources. The only significant difference between news sources per condition is 
when Democrats are faced with the story of Trump speaking to empty seats. 
CNN (M = 4.53, SD = 1.88), while not the lowest believability rating, is 
significantly lower than ABC News (M = 5.88, SD = 1.48) and Conservative 
Frontline (M = 5.43, SD = 1.69). The increase in believability rating for 
Conservative Frontline could be attributed to the article containing favorable 
information from an unlikely source. However, there was not much evidence of 
this in the previous chapter. ABC News (M = 5.88, SD = 1.48) is also significantly 
higher in believability than Breitbart (M = 4.94, SD = 1.93) and USANews365 (M 
= 4.77, SD = 1.97). For the opposite story on Trump speaking to filled seats, 
Democrats show no differences in believability between sources. Republicans, 
similar to previous analyses, seem immune to any source cue effects for either 
stories. This suggests that for the most part news source cues, fake or otherwise, 
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are not meaningful to respondents. In contrast, party identification explains a 
great deal of what news people find believable, even if it is fake. 
 
Figure 6. Difference Between News Source Cues by Party and Story 
  
 
 
Note: Each source corresponds with a letter. If the source has a letter above the bar, the 
source of the bar is significantly greater in believability than the source that corresponds 
with the letter above the bar (p < .05) 
N = 1220 
 
In Figure 7, the analysis is between party by story, further testing the 
Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis. Figure 7 shows the difference 
between the average believability ratings of Democrats and Republicans. Within 
the empty seats story, Democrats are significantly more likely to believe this story 
than Republicans for all sources except for CNN. Democrats still show higher 
believability ratings than Republicans for the empty seats story but not 
significantly so. It could be the case that Republicans find the headline about 
empty seats to be more believable coming from CNN since it’s an unlikely source  
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Figure 7. Between Party Analysis of Empty Seats and Filled Seats, Separately 
 
Note: Star (*) signifies significance at p < .05 level between parties within stories. 
N = 1220 
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to be reporting this type of headline, but I do not see similar effects for Liberal 
American or ABC News. The story about filled seats shows that Republicans are 
significantly more likely to believe the story than Democrats regardless of source. 
In both stories, there is one party that is well above average in believability of a 
story while the opposite party shows below average ratings. This is further 
evidence for the Partisan Motivated Reasoning Hypothesis. Not only are source 
cues largely ignored and partisans behaving accordingly to their partisanship, but 
Republicans, on average, find the headline about empty seats unbelievable 
(below 4) (M = 3.43, SD = 2.14) while Democrats find the headline about filled 
seats unbelievable (M = 3.94, SD = 2.09). 
 For a comparison between stimuli by party, I turn to Figure 8. For 
Democrats, every source except CNN showed that the story about Trump 
speaking to empty seats is more believable than the story about Trump speaking 
to filled seats. Similarly, regardless of the source, Trump speaking to filled seats 
is significantly more believable to Republicans than the story about Trump  
 
Figure 8. Between Stimuli (Empty vs Filled), Within Party Analysis   
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Note: Star (*) signifies significance at p < .05 level between parties within stories. 
 
speaking to empty seats.  On average, Republicans have over a two-point 
difference between those who see the empty story and the filled story. 
Democrats, on the other hand, vary more between sources but show, on 
average, about a one-point difference. It’s clear that within each party there is a 
consistent reaction towards each story consistent with their party prerogatives. 
 These results highlight how prominent partisanship is be when accepting 
information. I did not anticipate such a stark partisan response considering the 
stakes were rather low, politically speaking. The headline merely talks about an 
instance where Trump spoke to either empty seats or filled seats, yet it’s clear 
that the implications of an empty or filled auditorium is important to Republicans 
and Democrats. The believability of these stories clearly exhibits partisan 
motivated reasoning.  
 
Discussion 
 
Partisans use motivated reasoning to form opinions and make decisions 
(e.g. Nicholson 2012; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Theodoridis 2017) 
and evaluating news stories is no different. In this design, respondents were 
faced with almost identical news stories where the only difference is whether it 
was something positive or negative about Donald Trump. Some respondents 
were randomly assigned to the stimuli with an unfamiliar or incongruent source 
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but still did not waiver on whether the article was believable or unbelievable. 
Rather, partisans relied heavily on their biases to dictate the evaluation of this 
news story. Republicans also showed that they were particularly consistent in 
their ratings. 
 Partisan motivated reasoning exerts a large effect in all of the stories with 
the exception of the control study about the bipartisan bill that, by design, was 
not intended to be partisan. There were clear partisan effects even in the two 
stories that were not meant to be political (Vegas Shootings and Flu 
Vaccination). Partisanship overshadows news source cue effects suggesting that 
accuracy is not much of a motivation when pitted against rooting for your side or 
against the opposition.  
 On one hand, the results in the last two chapters have suggested that 
people may be reading and paying a bit more attention than simply relying on 
source cues. Yet it’s clear that the sole motivation when evaluating fake news is 
whether or not it aligns with one’s prior beliefs. In the case of fake news, paying 
more attention to source cues could be valuable in identifying stories that may be 
coming from a non-credible source. In this latest experiment, the headlines about 
Trump speaking to empty or filled seats were not designed to elicit as strong of a 
partisan screen than the other headlines yet the results show clearly that party 
rules over all other cues.  Sadly, this harbors a hospitable environment for fake 
news to flourish.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  39 
 
Chapter 4: Who Believes Fake News? Individual Characteristics 
that Make People Susceptible to Fake News 
 
 Partisanship is arguably the most important individual characteristic that 
predicts who believes political fake news, but other traits can play an important 
role too.  Researchers study the moderating role of other individual traits, that are 
not partisanship, in media use and evaluation. For example, those who are 
higher in political knowledge are more likely to engage in partisan selective 
exposure (Stroud 2008). There are no studies that I am aware of that looks at 
different individual determinants on the evaluation of fake news and minimal 
research on the individual determinants on evaluation of news in general. For this 
chapter, I intend to explore what individual characteristics, aside from 
partisanship, help explain why people believe fake news. Some of these traits 
are deeply ingrained political predispositions or personality traits exogenous to 
politics that are likely to predispose people to believe in fake news.   
 
Political Knowledge and Fake News 
Political knowledge is an individual characteristic that is commonly used in 
looking at different types of motivated reasoning. In Taber and Lodge’s (2006) 
research on motivated skepticism, they found that those who are politically 
knowledgeable are more susceptible to motivated bias because they know more.  
The people who know more show a greater ability to discount counterargument 
and incongruent facts.  In another study on motivated reasoning, researchers 
found that the more knowledgeable are more likely to engage in motivated 
reasoning because they feel more strongly about their biases (Strickland, Taber, 
and Lodge 2011).  
 Research has also shown that high political knowledge is often correlated 
with political interest and strength in partisanship (Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Lodge and Hamill 1986). Presumably, in terms of news and media, many of 
those high in political knowledge read, watch or listen to the news in some shape 
or form. It’s difficult to say which trait precedes the other. It’s most likely the case 
that there is a cyclical relationship between political knowledge, interest, and 
engagement. Political knowledge is particularly interesting in terms of fake news 
because the motivated reasoning literature would suggest that those higher in 
political knowledge are more likely to be biased. However, if they’re higher in 
political knowledge, one could also assume that they have the wherewithal to 
know when something does not look credible.  
 
Media and Fake News 
 
 As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, trust in media has been declining 
since the 1990s, and this decline is especially pronounced among Republicans 
(Gallop 2016). There have also been a number of findings that show that 
conservatives and Republicans show more distrust in the media than their liberal 
and Democratic counterparts (Jones 2004; Lee 2010). Jones (2004) suggests 
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that the distrust in the media is more of a perception of liberal bias than an 
overall distrust. Many of the talk radio shows or conservative outlets often warn 
against mainstream or liberal media calling for its viewers to be diligent in 
believing any of the information that comes from it. I expect that those who have 
higher distrust in media are less likely to believe in fake news. 
 There is also the sheer use of social media that could play a role in the 
susceptibility of believing in fake news.  One study found that those who spend 
more time consuming media on social media have a more accurate sense and 
belief about news (Allcott and Gentzkow 2018). Presumably, more time spent on 
social media would mean more possibilities of exposure to different types of 
news. I would expect the same to be the case in this study where a higher level 
of social media use would predict lower susceptibility to fake news. 
 
Nonpolitical Traits and Fake News 
 
Personality  
 
Political psychologists often look at nonpolitical traits to see if they are 
predictive of political outcomes. One of the more common nonpolitical traits that 
have been studied in political science is personality traits. The Big 5 personality 
consists of five traits: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability (or sometimes known as neuroticism), and openness to new experience 
(see Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2011). There has been a consistent 
association with conscientiousness and conservatism and openness to new 
experiences and liberalism (Alford & Hibbing 2007; Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et 
al. 2010c; Gosling et al. 2003; Jost et al. 2003; McCrae 1996; Mondak 2010; 
Mondak & Halperin 2008; Riemann et al. 1993; Van Hiel et al. 2000; Van Hiel & 
Mervielde 2004). Extraversion has also been predictive of higher levels of 
political participation (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), and agreeableness 
has been predictive of lower levels of political participation (Gerber et al. 2011b; 
Mondak & Halperin 2008).  
More in line with this research, studies have shown that those high in 
openness to experience are more likely to be interested and knowledgable in 
politics (Gerber et al. 2011a; Mondak 2010; Mondak & Halperin 2008). They are 
also more likely to try to convince others to vote for a particularly candidate and 
are more outspoken (Mondak et al. 2010). The same studies also show that 
those high in openness to experience and extraversion have larger social 
networks especially in comparison to those that are high in conscientiousness 
and emotional stability (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). The networks in the 
study did not look at social media networks, but it’s quite likely that the findings 
would be similar. With its increased use over the years, it’s become rather 
customary for it to be included as controls in models predicting political behaviors 
and is also included in the latest ANES. For this reason, I include these traits as 
possible predictors of susceptibility to believing in fake news. I expect that the 
same traits that increase political participation, interest, and social networks like 
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openness to experience and extraversion are possible predictors of believing in 
fake news.  
 
Self-Monitoring 
 
 Self-monitoring is an individual-level trait known to identify those that may 
be more susceptible to social desirability bias (Snyder 1974, 1979; Snyder & 
Gangestad 1986; Klar, Weber, and Krupnikov 2016). Those higher in self-
monitoring show that they are more likely to respond and comply to socially 
desirable expectations. For example, Klar et al. (2016) show that those higher in 
self-monitoring scores are significantly correlated with expressing lower support 
for Trump presumably since expressing support for Trump is socially 
undesirable. 
 Self-monitoring is an interesting individual trait in the context fake news 
because there is no clear socially desirable response. One hypothesis is that 
those high in self-monitoring may be less likely to say they believe in a fake news 
story because they don’t want to look naive or uninformed. On the other hand, a 
more socially desirable answer may be to agree or express belief so as not to be 
perceived as difficult. 
 
Magical Thinking 
 
 Magical thinking can be defined as believing that one event happens as a 
result of another without a plausible link of causation (Oliver and Wood 2018). 
While not the same as susceptibility of believing in fake news, the susceptibility 
of believing in a conspiracy theory is predicted by magical thinking. Recent 
research has found that those high in magical thinking are more likely to believe 
in conspiracy theories (Oliver and Wood 2018).  In the 2016 presidential election, 
those high in magical thinking were more drawn to Trump and his campaign due 
to his rhetoric and beliefs in conspiracy theories (Oliver and Wood 2018). 
 There is no prior study that I know of that looks at magical thinking as a 
predictor for susceptibility of fake news, but I expect the direction of the 
moderating effect to be similar to conspiracy theories. I hypothesize that those 
higher in magical thinking would be more likely to be susceptible to fake news. 
 
Methods  
 
Following the survey experiment (outlined in Chapter 2), there were a 
series of items intended to identify who is most susceptible to believing fake 
news. These items not only included demographics and partisanship but also 
trust in media, Big 5 personality traits, self-monitoring, magical thinking, political 
knowledge, and social media use.15 
                                               
15 Each of these sets of questions were put into blocks, and these blocks were 
randomized so that each respondent saw them in a different order. The only block that 
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The dependent variable is the same: believability. Again, this is measured 
on a 7pt scale of “Not at all believable” to “Extremely Believable”.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
 I include demographics in the analysis for control. Age is measured as a 
categorical variable where respondents had to choose one out of five responses 
for how old they are (M = 3.71, SD = 2.06).  Gender is measured as a binary 
variable coded as 0 for male and 1 for female (M = 3.71, SD = 2.06).16 For race, 
respondents were allowed to select multiple responses out of five race categories 
for ones they consider themselves to be. I turned this variable into a binary 
variable where 0 is coded for nonwhite and 1 is white (M = 3.71, SD = 2.06).    
 
Political Knowledge: Political knowledge is measured using four questions 
about current politics borrowed from the 2016 ANES. The measure is an 
additive scale where the lowest possible level is zero, where a respondent 
did not get any questions correct, to four, where the respondent got all 
four questions correct.  
 
Perceived Political Knowledge: Respondents were asked to consider how 
informed they are on current events. This six-point scale ranged from 
“Extremely informed” to “Definitely not informed.”  
 
Social Media Use: For social media use, respondents were asked how 
often they use social media. This five-point scale ranged from “daily” to 
“never”.  
 
Trust in Media: Trust in media is measured using the same question as in 
the ANES where respondents are asked how much of the time they can 
trust certain groups to do what is right. In this survey, I asked respondents 
about the federal government, media, and people in general. Because the 
study is about believability in news, I only used the responses from “the 
media.” The responses are on a four-point scale from “Almost never” to 
“Almost always.” 
 
Personality: The Big 5 personality traits are measured through the TIPI, a 
ten-item personality measure (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). Half 
of these traits are reverse coded and then there are five sets of two 
questions that are added together to create five personality traits: 
                                               
was not randomized was the magical thinking block. In the pre-test, many respondents 
noted that the magical thinking questions were alarming and made it difficult to 
concentrate on the questions that followed so the magical thinking items are anchored to 
the end of the survey. 
16 2 respondents replied as “other” or “prefer not to say” and were excluded from the 
analysis. 
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extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
openness to new experiences. The range of these personality variables 
are 1 to 7 where 7 means that the respondent exhibits the highest level of 
the trait.  
 
Self-Monitoring: The self-monitoring scale is created with three questions. 
Two of the questions are on a five-point scale and one question is on a 
four-point scale. All responses are standardized from 0 to 1. A higher 
response means higher self-monitoring. All three measures are then 
added together to create one self-monitoring scale that ranges from 0 
(lowest in self-monitoring) to 3 (highest in self-monitoring).  
 
Magical Thinking: Magical thinking is measured using six questions that 
are randomly ordered (Oliver and Wood 2018). Respondents had to pick 
one of two response options for each question. To create this scale, 
respondents only received a point for each question on one response. The 
range for this index is 0 to 6 where 6 is the highest level of magical 
thinking.  
 
All of these questions and their indexes can be found in the Appendix B 
 
Individual Traits by Party 
 
 Before diving into the analyses, I wanted to see the relationship with party 
identification and each of these individual traits. Being that partisanship plays 
such a big and important role in the believability of fake news, it’s important to 
see if there are any partisan differences within these traits. Table 5 shows the 
average believability rating between Democrats and Republicans per trait. The 
last column in Table 5 shows whether or not these differences are statistically 
significant. 
For the majority of these traits, there are no statistically significant 
differences between Democrats and Republicans. In fact, many are 
indistinguishable. The only ones that show a difference are the media questions 
where Democrats are more likely to use social media and trust in media. This is 
in line with multiple opinion polls gaging trust in media (Pew Research 2018; 
Gallup Poll 2016). With the Big 5 personality traits, Republicans are more likely to  
Table 5. Individual Traits by Party 
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Note: “Y” means yes, the difference between Democrats and Republicans is statistically 
significant and “N” means the different is not statistically significant 
  
be conscientious and Democrats are more likely to be open to new experiences 
just as previous findings have shown (Mondak 2010). 
 
Results 
 
 There are a variety of expectations on how and whether these different 
individual traits would be predictors of susceptibility to fake news. Table 6 shows 
two models that predict believability of fake news. Model 1 includes all fake news 
stories, which include eight stories except for the control story about the 
bipartisan bill. Model 2 includes the three least believable stories, which is about 
Mexico agreeing to pay for the wall, Russia contributing to Clinton’s campaign, 
and Obama overseeing separation of children at the border (respectively). Model 
2 is testing the scenario where the average person in the sample believes these 
headlines to be fake.  
Party identification and ideology are included. They are reverse coded for 
certain stories in a way where the higher number is consistent with ideological 
leaning of the article. For the models in Table 6, partisan identification and 
ideology were reverse coded for pro-Democrat articles. Table 7 presents the 
results of both OLS regression models predicting the believability of fake news 
stories presented with unstandardized beta coefficients. 
 
Table 6. OLS Model Predicting the Believability of Fake News Stories 
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Note: Model controls for age, gender, and race. Fixed effects included for source and 
story. For full model with control and fixed effects, see Appendix C. 
 
 For political knowledge, there were two rival hypotheses. On one hand, 
the motivating reasoning literature would posit that those who are higher in 
political knowledge are more likely to believe in fake news because they are 
more likely to be motivated by their biases. On the other hand, those high in 
political knowledge may be more likely to be able to spot fake news, be 
suspicious of it, and be less likely to believe it. In both Model 1 and 2, I find that 
the latter is the case for both political knowledge and perceived political 
knowledge. Those that are low in (perceived) political knowledge are more likely 
to believe in fake news. 17 
Similar to political knowledge, I had rival expectations for self-monitoring. 
Those higher in self-monitoring could be more likely to believe in fake news to be 
appeasing or they could be less likely to believe in fake news because it’s 
socially undesirable to believe in fake news. The results in Model 1 and 2 show 
that those higher in self-monitoring are more likely to believe in fake news. The 
effects are the largest in both models and becomes larger for Model 2. The 
results suggest that saying something is not believable may be considered as 
something socially undesirable.  
                                               
17 For an in-depth analysis on political knowledge and the credibility of sources, see 
Appendix D. 
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 The next trait is magical thinking. In line with its moderating role in belief in 
conspiracy theories, the expectation is that those higher in magical thinking are 
more likely to believe in fake news. Model 1 and 2 provide evidence for this 
hypothesis. In Model 2, as the fake news stories are more solidified and 
unbelievable, the effect grows a bit stronger. The results suggest that the same 
mechanisms by which magical thinking predicts belief in conspiracy theories, it 
also predicts belief in fake news. As fake news becomes “more fake”, this effect 
only grows stronger. 
 The expectation for social media use is that those higher in use would be 
less likely to believe in fake news. For both models, the coefficient is positive 
insinuating that those higher in social media use is more likely to believe in fake 
news. However, the coefficient is only positive in Model 1. In the aggregate of all 
the fake news stories where some are rated as more believable than others, the 
familiarity of these types of sensational stories to those who have high usage in 
social media may not have sounded any alarms of fake news. When the fake 
news stories are less reliable to the average person, the effect diminishes. 
 As expected, distrust in media should make an individual less likely to 
believe in fake news. For those that have a low level of trust in media, the range 
of believability may be capped at a lower place than those who have high levels 
of trust. The less credible the fake news articles seem, the more predictive power 
that distrust in media has on the believability of that article.  
 For the Big 5 personality traits, there was expectations for traits that 
predict political participation and interest to positive influence believability of fake 
news. This is not the case particularly in Model 2 where those lower in openness 
to new experiences are more likely to believe in fake news.  The only trait 
significant in both models is conscientiousness. In Model 1 and 2, those who are 
lower in conscientiousness are more likely to believe in fake news articles.  
 Partisanship and ideology are significant predictors of believability in 
Model 1 and 2 as expected. Having the partisanship and ideology be congenial 
with the ideological leaning of the article increases the likelihood that the article is 
believable. However, the effects in Model 2 diminish quite a bit compared to 
Model 1. For all other individual traits, the effects grow stronger in Model 2 but 
this isn’t the case for partisanship and ideology. This would suggest that as fake 
news stories become less believable to the average reader, there are other 
individual traits that become stronger predictors of believability over ideological 
congruence with the article. 18 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 This chapter exemplified that there are many other individual traits that 
alter the susceptibility to believing in fake news. Other predispositions, including 
nonpolitical ones, can be strong predictors of whether or not someone believes in 
                                               
18 In Appendix E, I present a similar set of analyses with the nonpartisan headlines. 
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fake news. The results paint a picture of the type of person that would be likely to 
believe in fake news. This person would be reading a fake news article that 
contained content that was congruent with their beliefs. They would also be low 
in perceived and measured political knowledge. They would have high trust in 
media. This person who is more susceptible into believing in fake news would 
also be high in self-monitoring and magical thinking.  
 It’s likely the case that there are interactions between these individual 
traits, but the takeaway for this analysis is to show that individual traits that may 
seem unrelated can be important pieces in understanding why people believe in 
fake news. It’s not only the case that the information fits what I want to hear. I 
may just be more likely because I don’t know that much about politics or I believe 
a lot of things I hear in the media. The importance of this is heightened when 
thinking about solutions on how to safeguard people from fake news. The 
solutions will differ depending on the reasons why individuals fall for any fake 
news in the first place. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
 Why do people believe in fake news? This dissertation is just a start into 
answering that question. My results suggest that people are not motivated by 
accuracy in the slightest. Even when stories seem outlandish or sensationalized 
and even when the sources are unfamiliar, people will still believe in stories that 
fit their worldview. The majority of political fake news is partisan and when there 
is an ideological leaning to the story, partisan motivated reasoning is activated. 
Even in the stories where there was less stake or a less clear ideological bias to 
the headline, partisans reacted strongly and divisively on their judgment of the 
article. The dependent variable was not whether partisans agreed or disagreed 
with the article but whether or not they believed in the article. Yet it seems that 
partisan respondents were unable to distinguish the two showing that when an 
article is incongruent with their beliefs, it must be less believable than another 
story that is congruent with their beliefs.  
 The results on individual characteristics showed that there are other 
predispositions aside from partisanship that play a role in the susceptibility to 
believing in fake news. While political knowledge can be encouraging of partisan 
motivated reasoning leading to bad decision making, it turns out to be a positive 
influence on believing in fake news. Those who are higher in political knowledge 
(and perceived political knowledge) are less susceptible to fake news. A person’s 
relationship to media can also dictate how easily they fall for fake news. Using 
too much social media may make someone more likely to believe in fake news. 
Alternatively, those who have a high distrust in media, in general, are less likely 
to believe in fake news. Lastly, there are nonpolitical traits that moderate the 
susceptibility to believe. Those who are high in self-monitoring and magical 
thinking are more likely to believe in fake news. The finding on magical thinking is 
in line with those who are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. 
 
Implications 
 
 The overpowering effect of partisanship on the believability of fake news 
suggests that motivating accuracy may not be easy. While the effect of 
partisanship is not surprising, the consistent ignoring of source cues is. I had 
previously expected that source cues would be one way for people to 
differentiate fake news with credible news sources. The results of these studies 
show that source cues are not a strong indicator for people to determine how 
believable a story is. Unfortunately, there aren’t many other cues to use when 
people are exposed to an article on social media. The stimuli used in this 
experiment mimicked what an individual would see on their own Facebook news 
feed. One cue that could be used to assess the credibility of an article is social 
media engagement. However, the level of engagement is something that is 
created through users and therefore, could be easily biased by bots or social 
  49 
 
engineering. There is currently no other cue or information created by the social 
media platform that would signal the credibility of an article.  
 The strength of partisanship in the assessment of the articles implies a 
few things. One, politics is divisive and fake news can highlight that. Partisanship 
may be a stronger motivator in reasoning when signaled by fake news versus 
credible news. Fake news articles and website creators seem to inadvertently 
know this as political fake news has been a huge source of revenue in the last 
couple of years. The political and sensational aspect of fake news is perhaps 
bringing out someone’s attachment to their party even more.  Secondly, social 
media and the Internet could be creating a hostile news environment for the 
public. The strong partisan motivated reasoning and ignoring of any source cues 
suggests that people may be immediately on guard when evaluating the news. 
Partisan are defensive and rather than thinking rationally, are thinking with their 
interests in mind. 
 The implications for the review on different individual traits and its effects 
on the susceptibility of fake news shines light on the fact that there is no one 
smoking gun that will explain why some people believe in fake news and why 
some do not. As with everything, it’s a combination of predispositions that will 
make an individual more or less susceptible to believing in fake news. As social 
media platforms continually collect information on their users, it’s not unlikely that 
they will be able to figure out some of these other traits. Facebook is already able 
to categorize their users into an accurate political ideology even without this 
information being given to them (New York Times). With the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal (see New York Times), researchers were able to figure out people’s 
religion, personality, and other individual traits. This data was then used to target 
people better with ads. It’s not unlikely that a fake news website or a social bot 
would be able to figure out those who are low in political knowledge or high in 
magical thinking and then target those people more heavily than those who are 
not.  
On the other hand, these findings about individual traits can help 
individualize solutions to this fake news problem. My findings suggest that telling 
people to take note of the source cue or to use their intuition may not work for 
everyone. Some people may have high trust in media who could use some help 
in growing some healthy skepticism of the news. Some people are more likely 
believe in conspiracies and be high in magical thinking and gaining more political 
knowledge could be helpful. Self-monitorers could learn that it’s not socially 
desirable or good to be agreeable when it comes to believing in fake news. 
 
Future Work 
 
 There is a large amount of work that still needs to be done in researching 
more about fake news. While there has been substantial work on looking at how 
fake news is disseminated, there is less on what happens afterwards. This 
dissertation looks at the underpinnings of how people may process and evaluate 
fake news. One of the next steps would be to see whether people adopt it as 
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knowledge. Research on conspiracy theories find that after exposure, there are 
people who believe this new information. Similarly, there are people who say 
they believe in fake news but then there are people who truly believe it versus 
saying they believe it for partisan reasons. A way to measure this would be to 
look at engagement. Presumably, an individual would not share a story on social 
media unless they believed this to be true and worth sharing. The decision to 
spread the news is usually a sign of endorsement.  
 There are copious amounts of behavioral and linguistic data that can be 
extrapolated from social media that would help answer the questions on who and 
when people seriously endorse these fake news articles. As mentioned, sharing 
a news story can be informative in measuring endorsement of fake news. 
Similarly, the other types of engagement such as likes or follows. There is also 
the text that may be written when sharing a story that is rich in information. The 
text that is written when sharing a story can show whether or not it was shared in 
gest or in seriousness.  
 As a follow-up to the findings about self-monitoring, another way to see if 
there is true endorsement of certain fake news articles is to ask about their 
beliefs in it more overtly. This also leads to the question of whether or not people 
perceive what they’re reading to be “fake”. My results would suggest that when 
an article is aligned with a person’s ideology, they are less likely to recognize it 
as fake news. This may be why those high in self-monitoring were more likely to 
evaluate something as believable, but what happens when the article is 
categorized as fake? It’s most likely socially undesirable to believe in fake news, 
if everyone agrees that it’s fake news. This exemplifies the complexity in studying 
fake news. 
 The implications of fake news on a larger scale, but looking at it from the 
bottom-up perspective, is also pertinent for future work. The overarching question 
about all of this is: how does fake news affect democracy? On the institutional 
side, there are questions about how fake news comes from different entities and 
the effects this has on our elections. On the behavioral side, and more in line with 
this dissertation, is the effect of fake news on the public.  
 The effects of fake news on the public ranges from the more obvious like 
distrust in media and misinformation to other grand theories like polarization. 
First, as outlined in the first chapter, distrust in media has been declining over the 
past decades and even more so for Republicans. From the results in Chapter 4, 
this could be beneficial in providing some skepticism about fake news, but a 
huge depletion of trust in media could have dire consequences for democracy. 
How much fake news is contributing to the declining trust in media is still an 
empirical question and is an important question to answer. Additionally, 
unpacking this distrust in media will be crucial to understanding how problematic 
this might be. While people have a general distrust for the media, it’s likely the 
case that they still have certain news channels or websites that they do trust. 
Republicans may also be interpreting these general questions about media to be 
mainstream media. All of these questions are necessary to understanding the 
role of fake news and distrust in media. 
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 Whether fake news leads to more misinformation is a question that has 
been highly discussed after the surge of fake news in the 2016 election.  It’s true 
that more people are being exposed to misinformation through fake news 
(Vosoughi, Roy & Aral 2018), but we do not know whether this actually leads to 
more misinformed individuals. The rise of fake news also came with the rise of 
fact checking website. However, Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) find that fact-
checks of fake news rarely find its way to those who are exposed to fake news. 
The canonical study on misinformation by Kuklinski et al. (2000) asks people 
their beliefs on welfare and find that’s most people are not only misinformed but 
confidently misinformed. This type of replication on fake news would be an 
interesting extension to see if the same types of wrong information is being 
created in the political sphere due to fake news. There are also well known 
wrongful information like on welfare of military spending that can be easily 
exacerbated by fake news. 
 Many of these fake news articles are highlighting stories and politicians 
that are hot topics at the time. They are sensationalizing an already heated topic 
or issue. This is why I believe that fake news is contributing to polarization. The 
increase of echo chambers on social media itself is an example of people self-
selecting into highly polarized groups. While this ability to only see news that 
confirms your beliefs is surely polarizing, I believe that fake news articles itself 
can be polarizing for two reasons. One, the content is highly partisan. As it 
apparent from the findings of this study, people are strongly blinded by their 
partisanship. These fake news stories seem to bring out the most partisan of 
mindsets when evaluating new news stories.  
 Secondly, the way fake news stories make people feel is an entirely 
understudied question. Imagine a scenario where a person comes across a fake 
news article that is incongruent with their beliefs. This person realizes that this 
story is coming from a source that is not credible but finds all of these people 
who are endorsing this story in the likes, shares, and comments. I would 
hypothesize that this person feels more removed from the people who belief this 
content then they were before. The similar reaction could occur when coming 
across a fake news story that is congruent with your beliefs. People who are 
rebuking this story may seem more distant because of this experience. These 
interactions and occurrences are happening over and over in the social media 
environment. Social media is meant to keep us connected (and it does), but the 
ability to be hyperaware of the differences in beliefs can be staggering. 
 There are myriad extensions to this research that has yet to be done, and 
fake news looks like it’s here to stay. As the ability to create Internet content 
becomes easier and more available, so will fake news websites. It’s important to 
figure out on a larger scale what the problem looks like, but it’s almost important 
to study what the implications of this are on an individual level. This dissertation 
is just a step forward into answering these questions.  
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Appendix A 
The headlines and the content they came with are presented in the table below. 
Each respondent saw each one of these stories. The source that each story was 
assigned to was randomized as well. 
 
 
 
Headline Content 
Justice Kennedy Announces 
Retirement after Donald Trump Made 
Him an Offer He Couldn’t Refuse 
Kennedy’s retirement is the 
culmination of a carefully orchestrated 
17-month campaign by the Trump 
administration to remake the Supreme 
Court before the 2018 midterms. 
Mexico Agrees to Pay For Wall - 
Offering Emergency Deal to Close 
NAFTA Tariff Loophole 
In a stunning move, the Trump 
Administration announced today that 
Mexico has agreed to pay for the wall. 
Putin Bombshell: $400 Million from 
Russia to Hillary Campaign 
Russian President Vladimir Putin 
dropped a bombshell at the Helsinki 
Summit, accusing US intelligence 
operatives of funneling $400 million 
from Russia to the Hillary Clinton 
campaign. 
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Trump lied about meeting with 
Russian officials during campaign 
Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed 
he had met with no Russian officials, 
while he was a candidate for 
president. However, two reports from 
early 2016 confirm Trump did in fact 
meet in person with Russian 
Ambassador Ivanovich Kislyak during 
the presidential campaign. 
Vegas shooting cover-up stories are 
collapsing. Are we closer to finding 
the truth? 
Inconsistencies in the Las Vegas 
massacre narrative have begun to 
surface, such as reports of multiple 
shooters, contradictions of the official 
timeline, and the disappearance of 
hero security guard, Jesus Campos. 
Lawmakers introduce bipartisan bill to 
speed up infrastructure permitting 
A pair of lawmakers have introduced 
bipartisan legislation aimed at 
accelerating the permitting process for 
infrastructure projects. This bill would 
allow railroads and public utilities the 
permanent ability to fund permitting 
reviews for some projects in an effort 
to fast-track the process. 
Experts Say Flu Shot Potentially 
Caused the Flu Epidemic 
New research shows that the flu 
vaccine is not only ineffective, but can 
also make you more susceptible to the 
flu and other viruses. Production of the 
flu shot caused the influenza virus to 
mutate into a more virulent strain, 
driving the deadly 2017-2018 flu 
season. 
Barack Obama Oversaw the 
Separation of 89,000 Children from 
their Parents During His Presidency 
New data show that more children 
were separated from their parents 
during the Obama administration than 
in the current Trump administration, 
which shows less than 2,000 children 
being separated at the border. 
Trump Speaks to Empty Seats in 
Charlotte, NC * 
Is Trump having trouble filling seats? 
Trump spoke in Charlotte, NC where 
there were 20,000 convention 
attendees for the four day conference, 
yet less than 3,000 attended the 
keynote address. 
Trump Speaks to Filled Seats in 
Charlotte, NC * 
Trump has no trouble filling seats. 
Trump spoke in Charlotte, NC where 
there were over 20,000 convention 
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attendees for the four day conference 
and filled every seat, including 
standing room for the keynote. 
 
* Respondents were randomly assigned to only one of these stories, not both. For 
further explanation, refer to Chapter 3. 
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Appendix B 
Individual Trait Questions 
Political Knowledge 
Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Mike Pence? 
 Member of Congress 
 Secretary of State 
 Senator 
 Vice President 
 
How long is the term of office of a U.S. Senator? 
 2 years 
 4 years 
 6 years 
 8 years 
 
Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? 
 John Boehner 
 William Gates 
 John Roberts 
 Clarence Thomas 
 
Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
 The President 
 The U.S. Senate 
 The U.S. House of Representatives 
 The Supreme Court 
 
Source: ANES 
 
Perceived Political Knowledge 
 
Do you consider yourself an informed person of current events? 
 
 Extremely informed 
 Informed 
Somewhat informed 
Somewhat not informed 
Not informed 
Definitely not informed 
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Big 5 Personality 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. You 
should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one 
characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
 
Extraverted, enthusiastic          
Critical, quarrelsome          
Dependable, self-disciplined        
Anxious, easily upset          
Open to new experiences, complex        
Reserved, quiet          
Sympathetic, warm          
Disorganized, careless          
Calm, emotionally stable          
Conventional, uncreative 
 
Disagree strongly 
Disagree moderately 
Disagree a little 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Agree a little 
Agree moderately 
Agree strongly 
 
Source: Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) 
 
Self-monitoring 
 
When you are with other people, how often do you put on a show to impress or 
entertain them? 
Never  
Once in a while 
Some of the time 
Most of the time 
Always 
 
When you are in a group of people, how often are you the center of attention? 
Never  
Once in a while 
Some of the time 
Most of the time 
Always 
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How good or poor of an actor would you be? 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
 
Source: Klar, Weber, and Krupnikov (2016) 
 
Trust in Media 
 
How much of the time do you think you can trust the following groups to do what 
is right? 
 
The federal government in Washington D.C. 
The media 
People in general 
 
Almost always 
Most of the time 
Some of the time 
Almost never 
 
Source: ANES 
 
Magical Thinking 
 
Please try to go through the next set of questions as quickly as possible. 
 
1. On the whole, would you rather . . . 
A. stick your hands in a bowl of cockroaches? 
B. stab a photograph of your family six times? 
  
2. Would you rather spend the night in . . . 
A. a luxurious house where a family had recently been murdered? 
B. a grimy bus station? 
  
3. Would you rather . . . 
A. stand in line for three hours at the DMV? 
B. secretly grind your shoe into an unmarked grave? 
  
4. Would you rather . . . 
A. ride in a speeding car without a seat belt? 
B. yell “I hope I die tomorrow” six times out loud? 
  
5. Would you rather . . . 
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A. sleep in laundered pajamas once worn by Charles Manson? 
B. put a nickel in your mouth that you found on the ground? 
  
6. Suppose you wanted to buy a ticket for a $500- million lottery. Would you 
rather 
buy your ticket from a nearby gas station that had . . . 
A. never sold a winning ticket but had no lines? 
B. sold two winning tickets in the past three years but had a long line? 
 
Source: Oliver and Wood (2018) 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C. OLS Model Predicting the Believability of Fake News 
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This is the full model from the truncated version showed in Table 6. Age is a 
continuous variable. Female and White are binary variables. In Model 1, being 
white makes a respondent more likely to believe in fake news articles. In Model 2 
where the cases are limited to the least believable stories, age plays a factor 
where the older you are, the more likely you are to believe fake news stories. 
Story and source are included as fixed effects in the OLS model. As expected 
from the results in Chapter 2 and 3, sources have no effect on believability. Even 
when story is captured in the model, the individual characteristics still account for 
a portion of the variance.  
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Appendix D 
 
Sub analysis of Political Knowledge 
  
 The motivated reasoning literature would posit that those higher in political 
knowledge are more likely to engage in partisan motivated reasoning. The 
findings in Chapter 4 find that those who are high in political knowledge are less 
likely to believe in fake news, regardless of party. 
To take a look at this from a different angle, I use the same questions 
used in Chapter 2 about the familiarity and credibility of news sources and split it 
by those low and high in political knowledge. Political knowledge is separated 
into two groups by the average (M = 2.79, SD = 1.14). Just as a memory 
refresher, respondents were given a list of news sources and were asked to mark 
the ones that they were familiar with. The proportions of those who state that 
they are familiar with the sources are shown in Table D. It shows that those high 
in political knowledge are more familiar with each of the news sources listed in 
comparison to those with low political knowledge.  
 
Table D. Familiarity and Credibility of News Sources by Low and High Political 
Knowledge 
 
 
Note: * signifies significance at p < .05 level 
 
The second half of Table 8 is on credibility. Respondents were asked how 
credible they find these news sources on four-point scale (Not Credible at All to 
Very Credible). It’s important to note that respondents did not see this question 
unless they said they were familiar with the source first. For the majority of these 
news sources, there is no significant difference between those low and high in 
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political knowledge and their perception of credibility. The only significant 
differences are found in the two fake news sites – Breitbart and InfoWars. In both 
of these cases, those low in political knowledge are more likely to say that 
Breitbart and InfoWars is higher in credibility than those higher in political 
knowledge. This suggests that although those higher in political knowledge may 
have more biases to be motivated by, they do have the ability to tell the 
difference between credible news and fake news. 
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Appendix E 
 
Table E. OLS Model Predicting the Believability of Nonpartisan News 
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 Table E shows three separate models based off of three separate stories. 
The first two columns are the nonpartisan control story about lawmakers 
agreeing on a bipartisan infrastructure bill. The second set of columns is the story 
about how the flu vaccinations made flus worse. Lastly, the third story is a 
conspiracy theory about the Las Vegas mass shooting and how it was 
orchestrated. All three of these stories were designed to be nonpolitical or to not 
have any a priori expectations about its partisan lean. Unlike in Table 6 and 
Table C, partisanship here is coded on the normal 7pt scale for that reason. 
However, in Table E, partisanship is significant for two of the fake news stories 
(not the control story about the bipartisan bill). Republicans are more likely to 
believe the flu story and the Vegas story. 
 For the control nonpartisan story about the bipartisan bill, I find that 
political knowledge has no effect on believability. However, when looking at the 
nonpartisan fake news stories (flu and Vegas stories), political knowledge is 
significant and in the direction expected. This suggests that there may be 
something about the sensational aspect of a story that signals the use of political 
knowledge. I find a similar result for magical thinking where the coefficient is not 
significant in the control bipartisan story but is a significant predictor in the fake 
news stories. Because Republicans are more likely to believe both the flu story 
and Vegas story, it’s difficult to disentangle here whether the activation of political 
knowledge and magical thinking is due to the partisan nature of the stories or the 
“fake” aspect of the stories. This would be an empirical question for future 
research. 
 Lastly, there are two traits that are consistently significant across all of the 
models and that is social media use and self-monitoring. Across all three of these 
stories, those who are higher in social media use are more likely to believe in 
fake news stories. The coefficient for self-monitoring is also positive and 
significant meaning that those who are higher in self-monitoring are more likely to 
believe in fake news stories. What this suggests is that these might be baseline 
traits that are used when evaluating news articles in general. In comparison to 
Table C/Table 6, the effect of social media use is higher in these nonpartisan 
stories. The fake news stories have a smaller or no effect of social media use 
being a predictor of believability. For self-monitoring, the relationship is strong 
and positive no matter what the stimuli; however, the effects are larger in the fake 
news conditions. 
